88

E&A V/4

The Morality of Killing Animals: Four Arguments

Introduction

I

I am going to examine four argu
ments designed to answer the ques
tion:
What, if anything, is wrong
with painlessly killing domestic animals
for food? Two are based on an appeal
to consistency, two on utility.
I will
not discuss the position, made famous
by Peter Singer, that rearing food
animals is immoral when utility is not
maximized.
That argument, which, in
Singer's words, is "based on the issue
of suffering and not on the question
of killing," 1 has forced many of us to
examine our attitudes toward animals
and led some of us to become vegeta
rians.
By leaving killing out of the
picture, however, many instances of
meat-eating are not obviously wrong
on utilitarian grounds, such as eating
meat from humanely reared animals.
Also, future possibilities include eat
ing meat from animals anesthetized or
genetically engi nee red to feel I ittle or
no pain while being reared.
Such
practices would most likely pass the
test of util ity . Tom Rega n, a n advo
cate of rights-based, vegetarianism,
goes even further: Hit is not obvi
ously true that the consequences for
everyone affected would be better, all
considered, if intensive rearing meth
ods were abandoned and we all (or
most of us) became (all at once or
gradually) vegetarians. "2
I am not
su re about that.
Nonetheless, I am
convinced that
effective
utilitarian
based
and
rights-based
arguments
supporting vegetarianism must show
that there is something wrong with
painlessly killing animals for food;
short of that, at best only certain
instances of meat-eating are immoral. 3
The fi rst a rgument I wi II look at is
one version of the argument for moral
consistency (AMC):
Roughly, if you

believe that all
humans (including
severely retarded
infants)
have a
right to life, then you must believe
that certain
animals,
those which
possess relevant capacities equal or
superior to "marginal humans," also
have that right.
After rejecting that
reasoning on
the ground that it
assumes too much about wh ich bei ngs
have a rig ht to I ife, I turn to the
second a rgument, recently supported
by Singer, that there is a utilitarian
basis for claiming that killing certain
animals, those which are self-con
scious (or have a desire to continu'e
living), is wrong.
In arguing that
utilitarianism of any variety leads to
no such conclusion, I develop a posi
tion on killing which I believe both is
entailed by consistent utilitarian rea
soning and is reasonable.
That posi
tion, the th i rd a rgument I wi II look
at, involves the claim that animals
lack a right to life, as do certain
humans, not because they lack self
consciousness, but because (a) they
lack the ability to be troubled by the
thought that their lives are not cov
ered by society's moral prohibition
agai nst kill ing or (b) they lack (a)
and killing them would not signifi
cantly frustrate the interests of other
beings.
I then examine some objec
tions to this position, the last of
which is set off as the fourth argu
ment.
It is a version of the AMC,
one frequently used by Singer:
tllf
we do not reject the belief that it is
wrong
to
kill
mentally
defective
humans for food, then we must reject
the bel ief that it is all right to kill
animals at the same level of mental
development for the same purpose. " ..
I argue that by appealing to a princi
pile Singer himself accepts, the princi
ple of utility, one can make. a strong
case for retaining both the first and
second bel iefs while avoiding cha rges

89

EcScA V/4
of
inconsistency
and
"species ism"
(ignori ng the interests of members of
other species for no reason other than
that they are members of other spec
ies).
.
As suggested above, my primary
aim in this paper is to show where I
think Singer's position on killing goes
wrong and that the change, compatible
with his basic utilitarian outlook, he
might consider making is adopting
argument #3; my secondary aim is to
show that argument #3 is promising.
Argument #1:
Regan's Version of the AMC
Tom Regan's formulation of the
AMC is a good place to start. Found
throughout the literatu re on an imal
rights, it has come to be known as
the "argument from marginal cases":
. . . arguments that might be
used in defense of the claim
that all human beings have this
natur·al right [to life] to an
equal extent would also show
that animals are possessors of
it,
whereas a rguments that
might be used to show that
animals do not have this right
would also show that not all
human beings do either. 5
Thus, according to Regan, each
and every reasonable criterion of the
possession of a right to life will either
Include all humans and also some ani
mals or exclude all animals and also
some
humans.
Rega n
f req uently
argues that if we assume that humans,
including infants and the severely
retarded, have a right to life, then
we must accept the implication that
any reasonable criterion capable - of
supporting that assumption will surely
include some animals as well. 6
If Regan is correct in claiming that
there is no defensible right-grounding
capacity (such as rationality or self
consciousness)
which
all
humans

possess and which all animals lack,
then we are left with choosing one of
the followi ng th ree option s :
(l )
believe that all humans and some ani
mals have a right to life, (2) believe
that some humans (the marginal cases)
do not have and some animals do have
a right to life, or (3) believe that
some humans and all animals lack a
right to life.
Whichever option is
chosen will demand signific?nt attitu
dinal changes concerning killing ani
mal-s or marginal humans.
Nearly all philosophers agree that
the AMC forces us to abandon the
traditional belief that all and only
humans have a right to life and adopt
one of the above options. As we shall
see, Singer defends the second option
and I defend the third. 7
Regan
accepts the fi rst option on the basis
of the force of the AMC in conjunction
with the postulate that even marginal
humans have a right to life. How he
defends that postulate is not important
here.
What is important 'to note is
that a defense of option ,#1 cannot
rest solely on the AMC, for it is inca
pable of supplying a reason for
rationally preferring one option over
any of the others because each is of
equal value from the point of view of
consistency. Obviously, to get any
where we need -to know what charac
teristic(s) a being must possess in'
order to deserve coverage-to have a
right to life-and which beings actually
possess that characteristic.
Setting Up the Problem
Which of the above options should
we select, and why? We have already
seen that an AMC-based defense of
option #1 is inadequate unless supple
mented by a defense of the assumption
. that marginal humans have a right to
life.
I n order for one of the options
to stand out as rationally preferable,
we need to know what it is that gives
one being (say, X) but not another
(Y) a right to life, that is, what
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justifies including X but not Y within
the scope of the moral rule against
killing. X must have something which
Y lacks. That could be one (or some
combi nation) of the following cha rac
teristics:
(a) a soul
(b) membership in the species Homo
sapiens

(c)
(d)
(e)

(f)

(g)

sentience:
the capacity to
experience pleasure and pain
rationality and language
"self-consciousness" (i n Sing
er's sense): the desire to con
tinue living as a distinct entity
with a past and a futu re
"cognizance":
the ability to
experience anxiety
and fear
upon realizing that one's life
lacks coverage (that one's life is
not covered by the moral prin
ciple against killing)
a certain relation to others:
that is, others have an interest
in XIS continued existence but
not in V's.

Natu rally there are other proper
ties that cou Id have been added to the
list but none which comes to mind
strikes me as plausible.
I have
excluded the
notion
of "inherent
value" because I think that the pro
ponents of this view, despite thei r
differences, agree that if X has
inherent value then X has, among
other things, a right to life. At any
rate, (d)-(g) are the properties most
relevant to the next three a rgumentsl
will be examining.
Looking over the list, if either (a)
or (b) is a justified criterion of hav
ing a right to life, then the tradi
tional view is justified: the view that
all and only human beings have a
right to life, which 'means, according
to that tradition, that it is a much
more serious matter, ~ven when side
effects are ignored, to kill a human
being than it is to kill an animal of
comparable intelligence and self-a
wareness. Arguments against (a) are

well-known and will not be summarized
here; suffice it to say, even if all and
only humans have immortal souls it is
hard to see why killing a human is
morally worse than killing an animal
that does not have the benefit of an
afterlife.
As for (b), Singer and
others have effectively argued that it
is a speciesist criterion and· is com
pletely indefensible.
After all, what
possible connection exists
between
havi ng twenty-th ree pai r's of ch romo
somes and having a right to life,?
Many consider (c) relevant to poss
essing a right to be spared unde
served pain but it is not at all obvi
ous
how
sentience
could
be
a
sufficient condition of having a right
to life. I will argue that (d) is some
times relevant to the morality of kill
ing because some beings capable of
reasoning and of communicating do so
in such a sophisticated way that· they
possess (f), that is, the ability to
experience fear when they "figure
out" that thei r Iives a re not covered
by . the prohibition against killing.
Criterion (e), self-consciousness, is
defended by Singer and will be dis
cussed momentarily.
For a being to
have (f), what, for lack of a better
term, I have called "cognizance," it
must at least be both self-conscious,
(e), and able to reason and communi
cate with some soph istication, (d). In
my defen se of option #3-that some
humans and all domestic food animals
lack a right to life-I will be defending
criterion (f); this means that (d) and
(e), being individually necessary and
jointly sufficient conditions of (f), will
in effect be supported. Finally, I will
also support criterion (9), that is, I
will argue that we must seriously con
sider coveri ng a bei ng by the ru Ie
against killing even if it lacks the
ability to be tr'oubled by not falling
under that ru Ie so long as other
beings have a (rational) interest in its
continued existence.
Argument #2: Singer's Defense of
Criterion (e) and Option #2
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In various places Singer considers
the complex topic of killing.
For
brevity, let us focus on one case
which he addresses:
lfwhether it
would be r'ight to kill and eat a pig if
the pig lived happily under pleasant
conditions and was killed painlessly. "8
To answer that, Singer employs two
unrelated str~ategies: a version of the
AMC and utilitarianism.
His use of
the AMC is the fourth argument I will
examine.
The cOI~e of his utilitarian
analysis is that "while species makes
no difference to the wrongness of
killing, the possession of certain
capacities, in particular the capacity
to see oneself as a distinct entity with
a future does."9 He calls that capac
ity "self-consciousness," calls anyone
possessing
it
a
"person,"
and
observes that some "human beings"
(members of the species Homo sapiens)
are not persons while some animals
are.
This leads to the question
whether a
pig
is
self-conscious.
Singer admits that this "is not an
easy matter to settle." 1 0
However,
since much is at stake (maybe we are
turning persons into bacon),
and
since it is difficult to tell whether a
pig is a person, Singer believes that
"it would seem better to give the pig
the benefit of the doubt. "11

This analysis raises many questions
. of cou rse.
For ou r pu rposes, two
stand out:
What, more precisely,
does Singer mean by "self-conscious
ness," and, secondly, why does he
believe that self-consciousness is rele
vant to,
and carries such great
weight when dealing with, the wrong
ness of killing?
To be lfself-conscious" in Singer's
sen se a bei ng mu st at least be awa re
of itself as an entity, distinct from
other entities in the world and we
"might add the requi rement that the
being be aware that it exists over a
period of time, that it has a past and
a futu re; for to be awa re of oneself
as an entity it may be necessa ry to be
I

awa re of oneself as ex isti ng over some
period of time,
however brief. "12
Finally,
"Rationality
is
probably
already included in our conception of
self-consciousness,
since
a
being
would not attain self-consciousness
without possessing at least a minimally
rational
understanding
of
the
world. "13
One might call this the
"minimal sense of self-consciousness."
For our purposes, the key to
Singer's account is that a self-con
scious being has a desire or prefer
ence to go on
living.
What is
involved in having such a preference
is a matter of some dispute.
Singer
seems to think that a being capable of
having some preferences about its own
futu re thereby has a preference to go
on living.
It is a preference in a
minimal sense, better understood per
haps by contrasti ng it with what
might be called the "extended sense"
found in views such as Regan's:
To desire to continue to live
presupposes that one have a
conception of one's own mortal
ity-that one can forsee or
anticipate one's eventual dem
ise. And it presupposes, fur
ther, that, having considered
what
one's
death
involves
together with one's anticipated
life prospects, one desires to
continue to live in preference
to dying. 14
According to Regan, then, animals
that
are
minimally
self-conscious,
though having some desires relating to
their future, lack a desire to go on
living in the
relevant (extended)
sense because it "is extremely doubt
ful that the moral patients at issl~e
have the intellectual wherewithal· to
conceive of thei r own death or to
make the kind of comparative judgment
Singer's
view
requires. "15
Singer
would no doubt agree that pigs and
other (presumably) minimally self-con
scious beings lack this "\ntellectua\
wherewithal, " yet claim that such
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beings
nonetheless
have,
in
some
sense, a desire to go on living.
We
can grant him that claim and still
show that his view on killing self-con
scious beings is inadequate.
This
takes us to ou r second question.
Singer believes that self-conscious
ness is a relevant consideration when
evaluating the wrongness of killing
because killing a being with a desire
to continue living involves frustrating
that desire.
Of course one might
argue that, once dead, the being will
not experience the frustrated desi re.
Singer's
well-known
reply
to this
involves distinguishing classical from
preference utilitarianism:
According to preference utili
tarianism, an action contrary
to the preference of any being
is, unless this preference is
outweighed by contrary pref
erences,
wrong.
Killing
a
person who prefers to continue
I ivi ng
is
therefore
wrong,

other

things

being

equal.

That
the
victims
a re
not
around after the act to lament
th e fact that th ei r p referen ces
have been disregarded is irrel
,evant. 16
The clause "other things being
equal" invites a problem in light of
Singer's admission that "the prefer
ence of the victim could sometimes be
outweighed by the preferences of oth-'
oth-·
ers. "17 So, in the case of the happy
pig, is it not plausible to suppose
that the preferences of those who
have cared for and plan to eat the pig
outweigh the pig's preference to con
tinue living?
After all, as Regan's
position implies, a pig, arguably lack
ing the capacity to form a conception
of its own mortality, does not in any
meaningful sense prefer its future
existence to nonexistence.
But, even
ignori ng that important poi nt,
and
granting that the interest an animal
takes in its future' existence is rele
vant to the question of killing,
I

believe that Singer gives that interest
much more weight in the decision
making process than his utilitarian
outlook can justify.
One way of sup
porting that claim is to turn to Sing
er's view on "replaceability."
I will
try to
show that,
even
on
the
assumption that pigs are minimally
self-conscious,
h is
position
impl ies
they are replaceable; thus killing them
can, contrary to what Singel~ thinks,
be rather easily justified. (Another
way of supporting that claim, which I
will not pursue but which I think is
valid,
would
involve showing
that
Singer implicitly gives greater weight
to life preferences than to tastepref
erences even when they are of equal
intensity and that he supplies no jus
tification for so doi ng. )
Let us start by looking at Singer's
position on
killing
sentient beings
lacking
self-consciousness-"ch ickens
co u Id be a n e x arn pie. " 1 8
Given that an animal belongs to
a species incapable of self-con
sciousness, it follows that it is
not wrong to rear and kill it
for food, provided that it leads
a pleasant life and, after, being
killed,
will
be replaced . by
another animal which will lead
a similarly pleasant life and
wou Id not have existed if the
first
animal
had
not
been
killed.
This means that vege
tarianism is not obligatory for
those who can obtain meat from.
animals that they know have
been reared in this manner. 19
The
"replacement
clause"
is
inserted to avoid the utilitarian objec
tion
that
killing
a
happy
animal
reduces the total amount of pleasure.
in the world.
Thus, the only moral
consideration involving
killing
non
self-conscious beings is the matter of
HII i ng the pleasu re void because they
"can properly be regarded as recepta
cles for experiences of pleasu re and
patn,
rather
than
as
individuals
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lives

of their own.

"2.0

More

. with non -self-conscious
life, birth and death cancel
each other out; whereas with
self-cons'cious beings the fact
that once self-conscious one
may desire to continue living
means that death inflicts a loss
for wh ich the bi rth of another
is insufficient compensation. 2. 1
The above claim is not, and can not
be, supported by Singer.
Even if
pigs are self-conscious, and we kill
one, the replacement pig wi II come to
develop self-consciousness,
and
at
that point will be a near perfect
replacement for the one that was
killed.
I say "nea r perfect" because,
according to preference utilitarianism,
by killing the pig we frustrated its
preference to continue living and that
loss was not sufficiently offset by
bringing into existence a replacement
pig and rearing it under similar con
ditions. That loss, however, could be
offset by a gain elsewhere:
for
instance, by taking steps to make the
replacement pig's life even more plea
sant than that of the pig it replaced,
thereby making it a "perfect replace
ment. "
I believe this shows that
painlessly' taking the life of a pig (or
any minimally
self-conscious being)
and filling the "void" with the bi rth
of another can be easily justified on
utilitarian grounds and that Singer is
mistaken in believing otherwise.
To summa rize, for the simple rea
son cited above, Singer fails to justify
the belief that pigs, but not chickens,
a re non - replaceable, that kill i ng the
former is, whereas killing the latter is
not, a morally serious matter.
In
neither case (if the killing is done
. discreetly) are there measu reable side
effects in the form of grief or anxiety
felt by other beings like chickens,
pigs,
birds,
microorganisms,
or
humans.
True, if Singer is correct
about which beings are self-conscious,

then in the case of killing pigs, as
opposed to chickens, one frustrated
preference is not quite offset by the
birth of another, but that, we have
seen, is a problem easily remedied.
In short,
the mere possession of
self-consciousness is not the capacity
to wh ich a uti lita rian (act or ru Ie,
hedonistic or non-hedonistic) should
appeal in drawing a line between those
beings who are seriously covered by
the moral
rule against killing and
those who are not, those beings who
have a strong presumptive right to
I ife a nd those who do not.
By unfolding the position I think
Singer should accept and which I am
inclined to accept, the difficulties I
have with Singer's position become
more appa rent.
c

Argument #3: A Defense of Option #3
and Criteria (f) and (g)
believe that killing certain self
conscious
beings
raises
.no
moral
problems within a utilitarian framework
such as Singer's.
Which: self-con
scious beings? Those which· lack both
(f) and (g).
Why (f) is important is
obvious: Any being with the capacity
to experience anxiety and fear upon
knowi ng that its life lacks coverage
(is viewed as lacking inherent value),
would most likely lead a worse life
than if it knew it had coverage; for
that reason, utility would no doubt be
maximized by including such a being
within the scope of the moral rule
against killing, by viewing its life as
specia I a nd non - replaceable. 2. 2.
If a
bei n g lac ks (f) , it does not follow
that ki IIi ng it raises no mora I prob
lems.
Even if the killing is painless
and out of range of other beings
capable of feeling anxiety were they
to witness it, nonetheless, mates, off
spring, companions, or humans might
have an interest in that being's con
tinued existence and thereby suffer as
If, after all the
a result of its loss.
consequences
are
cou nted
and
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weighed, the killing failed to bring
about the best agg reg ate resu It, then
it would be wrong. Thus, possessing
(g) should, given utilitarian theory,
enable that being to be covered by
society's prohibition against killing,
even though it lacks (f).
I n short, if a bei ng has what for
convenience I have been calling a
"right to life," that right, on my
account, can be grounded either on
the interest that being has in avoiding
the anxiety that would occur should it
know that its Iife lacks coverage (a
self-based right to life) or on the
interest other beings have in avoiding
the anxiety and grief that would occur
should that being's life lack coverage
(other-based right to life).
Either
way, having a right to life (deserving
coverage) is based on considerations
of uti Iity; either way, the life in
question should be regarded as non
non
replaceable
(as
having
inherent
value) .
Does a pig have either (f) or (g)?
It is hard to make a case for its
possessing
(f),
cognizance,
even
though one might grant that it is
self-conscious
in
Si nger' s
sense.
Su rely a pig is not capable of being
troubled by the knowledge that it is a
replacement for a pig which has been
killed, so the replacement will "con
"con
tai n" about the same amou nt of pleas
pleas
ure as the pig it is replacing (for it
wi II experience no dissatisfaction from
living with the thought that it is a
replacement, that someday it will be
killed for food).
But some self-con
self-con
scious beings have the additional
capacity;. (f), to be troubled by living
in a world in which they lack cover
cover
age and are perceived as expendable
or replaceable. This fact leads me to
"draw the line" between cases of kill
kill
ing which are serious and cases which
are not in a place different than does
Singer; and it strikes me that the
place I have drawn it is about where
a utilitarian (of any variety) should
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draw it.
On my account, marginal humans
lack a self-based
right to
life.
(Singer would agree, not on the
g rou nd, though, that they lack (f),
cognizance, but that they are thought
to lack (e), self-consciousness.) This
does not mean that any instance of
killing marginal humans is morally jus
jus
tified.
Of course not.
There are
additional
considerations:
others
might have a strong interest in the
conti n ued existence of the bei ngs in
question.
This takes us to (g), the
side effects argument.
It is quite possible for something
lacking
(f)-such
as
a
severely
retarded human, a pig, a sentient
bei ng, a plant, or a rock formation-to
have an other-based right to· contin
contin
ued existence, since it is possible for
beings to have an interest in such
things.
The same point, limited to
pigs, can be expressed without refer
refer
ring to "rights":
If suddenly a num
num
ber of beings were sufficiently dis
dis
tu rbed by the fact that pigs were
being painlessly killed and eaten, to
the point where that practice failed to
achieve the optimal balance of satis
satis
faction over frustration of prefer
prefer
ences, then a prohibition against kill
kill
ing and eating pigs, even happy pigs,
would be morally justified.
However,.
this is not presently the case. True,
as nonconsequentialists are quick to
poi nt out, it cou Id be the case some
some
day.
If so, killing and eating pigs
would
be
wrong
on
utilitarian
grounds-unless, of course, one both
accepts a version of utilitarianism in
which frustrated "irrational desires
and aversions" (however defined) are
given less weight or totally discounted
in utility assessments and determines
that most aversions to killing pigs
painlessly are irrational.
More on
that later.
is

To summarize, I bel ieve that there
a sig n ificant difference between
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killing a being possessing (f) and
killing a pig. What counts is not so
much the capacity, emphasized by
Singer, to desire continued life, as
the capacity to recognize that one and
those one cares about are not covered
by society's moral prohibition against
killing.
That latter capacity presup
presup
poses rather extensive commu n ication
and reasoning skills because in order
to experience the anticipatory dread
of death a being must have a concep
concep
tion of its own mortality and be able
to come to know that its Iife or~ that
of another being in whom it has an
interest is endangered. What is cru
cru
cial to distinguishing cases of killing
which raise serious moral problems
within a utilitarian perspectiv~ from
those which do not is distinguishing
those beings who are capable of "los
"los
ing sleep" over the realization that
thei r Iives lack coverage from those
who are not.
Painlessly killing a
nameless pig out of sight of others
does not, presumably, cause other
beings much grief or anxiety.
The
most that happens is that, if it were a
contented pig, a certain amount of
pleasu re is lost from the world.
So,
if one is upset by this loss or one's
normative theory demands that one be
troubled by this loss, then one can
replace the dead pig with the bi rth of
another pig or, and this should be
acceptable to Singer, create that
. amount of pleasure
(assuming of
cou rse that it can be roughly gauged)
in some other manner.
I will now consider two rather sim
sim
ilar objections to argument #3.
One
strategy consists of pointing out some
counterintuitive implications of adopt
adopt
ing criteria (f) and (g). The second
involves an appeal to moral consis
consis
tency, namely, if you bel ieve that it
is wrong to kill marginal humans for
food (or for similar, trivial reasons),
then you should also believe that it is
wrong to kill animals at the same level
of mental development for food. This
second
objection
is
set
off
as

argument #4.
One might object to the view that
cognizance is a sufficient condition of
having a right to life by showing that
it has some rather unsavory implica
implica
tions.
Among those beings clearly
excluded by th is criterion, besides
animals and severely retarded infants,
are (a) normal infants, perhaps up to
three years of age, and (b) the hope
hope
less Iy sen i Ie.
Now, it is true that
criterion (f) sets a very high cutoff
point for moral considerability (with
respect to killing), even higher than
those set by Warren and Tooley in the
abortion debate.
I do not think this
is
a
serious
problem,
however,
because these purported counter-ex
counter-ex
amples can be dismissed by appealing
to what I take to be another sufficient
condition of moral standing, (g).
Turning first to objection la, let
us consider the case of a healthy one
year old infant, lacking (f) , whose
pa rents no longer ca re for if and want
it ki lied. To deal with such a case, I
would
bring
criterion
(g)
into
play-that is, I would appeal to the
side effects-and argue that the prac
prac
tice of killing unwanted, non-cogni
non-cogni
zant children would have less net
utility than some alternative practice,
such as putting them up for adoption.
If one is in a situation in which find
find
ing surrogate parents is impossible,
then I would, relying on (g) again,
try to show that actions of this type
would so frustrate the interests others
have in children that utility would not
be maximized. Though rare cases can
be imagined in which particular acts
of killing healthy infants (or adults)
would bring about marginal increases
in utility, the general practice of
placing them outside the scope of the
moral rule against killing would not
produce as much net utility as cover
cover
ing them by that rule.
Objection 1 b-that there is, on my
account, nothing wrong with killing.
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sen i Ie
individuals
lacking
cogni
zance-alsomisses the mark.
First of
all, the fact that such individuals
were cognizant throughout most of
their lives means that, if they grew
up in a society with a rule against
killing wh ichdid not cover the senile,
then it seems reasonable to suppose
that as a g roup they wou Id experience
considerable stress
when
thinking
about what might happen to them and
those they care about.
Presumably,
th is wou Id not be offset by th e
advantages of a moral principle sanc
tioning killing in such cases.
Sec
ondly, lacking coverage would frus
trate the preferences of those who
prefer to see the s'enile cared for
rather than killed.
Though not as
s t ro n gas the ca sea g a ins
instin
tinfan
fan tic ide,
these probable consequences add up
to a fai rly strong case agai nst placi ng
the senile outside the scope of the
rule which prohibits killing.
Obviously, many issues need to be
addressed in this connection, includ
ing the proper role of rules in utilita
rian reasoning, but I hope enough has
been said to indicate how I would go
about defending argument #3 against
objections like la and lb. It is worth
noting that Singer's position, argu
ment #2,
is vulnerable to similar
objections, thus Singer would take on
no new problems if, as I th ink he
should, he were to adopt argument
#3.
Naturally, because group prefer
ences can change over time, there are
some dangers in resting cases for and
against killing on criterion (g).
For
instance, we could someday come to
feel no disapproval when reflecting on
the killing of healthy human infants,
in which case any (g) -based argument
would be undermined; or, as men
tioned earlier, we could come to have
such a strong interest in pigs and
other animals that killing them-even
painlessly, after having lived a plea
sant life-would b~ morally wrong, in
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which case argument #3 would be
invalid. To this a utilitarian (besides
biting the bullet) can only say that,
should such preferences occur, they
ought to be discounted because they
are irrational and that what counts
are those preferences one would have
under certain, rather ideal conditions.
This raises the problem of the nature
of irrational preferences and thei r t"ole
in utilitarian decision-making, a prob
lem which would have to be fully
addressed if I were trying to provide
a complete defense against objections
like' 1a and 1b.
My concern, how
ever, is more modest:
to show that
argument #3 is promising.
Thus, I
will only briefly address this prob
lem-and, since it also arises when
considering the second objection, to
avoid repetition, I wi II ta ke it up at
that juncture.
Because the reasoning
utilized in that objection is rather
popular and somewhat attractive, I
have isolated it as argument #4.
Argument #4:
Singer1s Version of the AMC
Singer frequently confronts us with
a dilemma similar to this:
"If we do
not reject the bel ief that it is wrong
to kill mentally defective humans for
food, then we must reject the belief
that it is all right to kill animals at
the same level of mental development
for the same purpose. "23 Let us put
this reasoning in the form of an
objection to the position on killing
animals I am defending:
If, as you
believe, there are conditions under
which it is morally acceptable to kill
animals for food, then you must
believe that it is all right to kill
humans at the same level of mental
development for food, but since you
surely would not want to hold that'
belief, consistency demands that you
abandon the other belief. This line of
reasoning repeatedly occurs in the Iit
er'atu re on animal rights.
The point
is always that we do things to animals
that we would not think of doing to
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even horribly and permanently defec
tive human beings (such as rear, kill,
and eat them), the bottom line being:
"we are guilty of a gross form of
prejudice
("speciesism"):
we
are
grossly inconsistent from the mor'al
poi nt of view." 2 4
IIs it the case that
one of the beliefs in Singer's dilemma
must be rejected?
If so,
nearly
everyone will reject the belief that it
is all right to kill animals for food.
Yet argument #3 supports that belief.
Clearly, something must give-and it is
Singer's AMC.
Let us begin by noting that the
reasoning II have been using is not
"speciesist" if by that we mean either
ignoring the interests of members of
other species simply because they are
members of other species or devising
a right to IIife criterion with the intent
of including all and only members of
ou rspecies. ·1 have made neither of
these moves.
My reasoning could,
though, be speciesist in this sense:
Morally, II am willing to accept killing
and eating of animals but not of
humans at the same level of mental
development and the on Iy justification
II can give for this is that marginal
humans are members of the species
Homo sapiens.
However, that is not
the justification II would give. II have
already argued that within a utilita
rian framework there is a relevant
difference between severely ret a r'ded
humans and animals which often justi
fies treating the former in ways that
would be wrong to treat the latter;
the difference is not what species
each belongs to but the radically dif
ferent side effects that would result
from similar treatment.
Basically, a
number of humans would be very
upset if the two groups received simi
lar" treatment.
For this reason, even
counting like interests of all beings
equally, painlessly killing and eating
marginal humans probably would not
bri n9
ng about the best agg regate bal
ance of good over evil all considered,
whereas, in the case of pigs, it very
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well could.
"Because of his version
of
often
utilitarianism,"
Regan
stresses, "Singer must insist on the
relevance of side effects. "25
It is
puzzling that Singer routinely ignores
this relevant difference between mar
ginal humans and animals, as in his.
use of the AMC. 2 G
Perhaps Singer can show that this
difference is not "relevant." Passages
like this apparently attempt to do so:
"If we make a distinction between ani
mals and these [marginal] humans,
how can we do it, other" than on the
basis of a morally indefensible prefer
ence for members of ou r own spec
ies?"27
However,
since Singer is
committed to determining what· is mor
ally indefensible in terms of utility
and is committed to determining utility
on the basis of satisfied and frus
trated pr"eferences,
pt"eferences, a preference itself
cannot be morally indefensible.
So it
appears that his objection to the rea
soning II have used against his AMC
and in support of argument #3 must,
to avoid
circularity,
be
reworded
(perhaps along these lines):
Utility
assessments-in this case, of killing
and
eating animals
and
marginal
humans
respectively-should
not
include the satisfaction and frustration
of preferences for members of one's
own species because such preferences
are arbitrary and irrational; in other
words, one should not appeal to the
speciesist
of
preferences
certain
humans ina pu rportedly nonspeciesist
effort to show that killing and eating
animals is morally permissible but that
killing and eating members of the
species Homo sapiens is not-yet that
is exactly what you have done.

This objection to argument #3 win
wiU
not do, nor will it salvage Singer's
AMC.
Singer (should he reason in
the above manner) would be assuming
both that there is something irra
tional,
speciesist,
or
inconsistent
about a person who is not distressed
by the practice of killing and eating
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animals but who would be seriously
upset were we to do those things to
marginal humans and that irrational
sympathies and preferences ought to
be excluded from utility assessments;
yet he offers no theory of rational
preferences, no theory of excl usion.
Hence, his position will not allow him
to discount those human preferences
wh ich, for whatever reason, follow
species lines.
(Analogical reasoning
based on intuitions he hopes the
reader has regarding the wrongness
of sexism and racism does not supply
him. with a basis for discounting cer
cer
tain preferences because he explicitly
disallows appeals to intuitions for the
purpose
of
establishing
normative
claims. )
Enough has been said to show that
the second objection to argument
#3-Singer's AMC-is not adequately
supported.
Of cou rse this does not
mean that it cannot be adequately
supported.
Naturally, we could ask:
What jf Singer or someone else were
successfu Ily to defend the view that
certain preferences are irrational and
therefore ought to be discounted from
utility calculations?
Whatever view
might emerge, I seriously doubt that
the preferences in question would
turn out to be irrational, in which
case, the side effects of killing ani
ani
mals or marginal humans for food
would not change much. For obvious
reasons a full defense of that claim
cannot be offered here, nor is it
really necessary.
That claim is not
relevant to my points that there is
(without deviating from preference
utilitarianism) a defensible escape from
the dilemma posed in Singer's AMC
and that Singer's preference utilita
utilita
rian position leads to argument #3,
not argument #2; however, it is rele
rele
vant to my secondary point that argu
argu
ment #3 is promising (in particular, to
my earlier assertion that (g)-based
reasoning can successfully deal with
objections la and 1 b-the infanticide
and "senilicide" reductions).
A few
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comments, then, are in ot'der.
ol'der.
Consider, for a moment, what I
take to be one of the best theories of
rational preferences, that defended in
various places by Richard Brandt,
most recently and thoroughly in A
Theory

of the Good and

the

Right.

According to his view, a. desire or
aversion (in this case, having a much
stronger aversion to killing marginal
humans for food than to killing ani
ani
mals for food) is irrational if and on Iy
if it would be extinguished or its
intensity diminished by submitting it.
to a process similar to cognitive psy
psy
chotherapy
(roughly,
vividly
and
repeatedly reflecting upon all the rel
rel
evant, available information while in a
normal frame of mind and committing
no errors of logic). I doubt that this
process would lead to altered pr'efer
pr'efer
ence strengths to the point where a
person would be equally upset by the
killing of animals and marginal humans
for food.
This seems true because
the aversion nearly all of us have to
killing marginal humans for food· is
probably based on· an innate process,
perhaps the process of "sentiment
"sentiment
generalization, which impels us to
extend our sympathies on the basis of
superficial similarities, perh·aps even
on the basis of
species. "28
The side effects of killing and eating
marginals would be worse than killing
and eating animals due to this sympa
sympa
thetic response. (I am not suggesting
that all "natural" preferences should
count, rather, all "rational" prefer
prefer
ences should cou nt. )
Now, if such
sympathies would survive cognitive
psychotherapy
in
Brandt's
sense
(which, partially because of their ori
ori
gin, is highly probable), they could
not be considered either irrational or
speciesist, and thus could not be dis
dis
counted while deliberating about what
is morally right; the same holds if
one's interest in painlessly killing and
eating animals would survive cognitive
psychotherapy.
Should this happen,
these
preferences
would
not
be
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making.
I think that approach can
successfully
undercut
the
many
appeals to consistency found through
out the literature which are similar to
Singer's
AMC-for
instance,
"If
[certain] conditions . . . can be sat
isfied by morons, stocking and using
them for food or experimentation is no
more or less reprehensible than doing
so with animals" 29 -and which are
designed
to force
us to choose
between believing that killing morons
for food is morally permissible and
believi ng that killing an imals for food
is morally wrong.

irrational because they passed the test
of rationality; they would not be arbi
trarily speciesist
because,
though
conforming to species
lines, they
would
be rationally justified.
(I
would apply reasoning similar to that
used above to fu rther support my
position, sketched earlier, that argu
ment #3 is not in any realistic sense
vulnet'able to the cha rge that, shou Id
peoples'
felt
preferences
radically
change, it could justify the practice
of killing healthy infants and senile
adults.)
Whatever problems that theory of
rational preferences might have, my
point remains: Since Singer both fails
to show that it is irrational to be more
offended by the practice of killing and
eating marginal humans than by the
practice of killing and eating animals
and fails to provide a justification for
excluding irrational preferences from
utility appraisals, his AMC (argument
#4) is neither a good argument in its
own right nor a good objection to
argument #3; this means that there is
a defensible escape from Singer's
dilemma which is consistent with his
own utilitarian approach to decision-

Conclusion
I have tried to show that utilitari
an-based arguments
against eating
meat, those which rest on the fact
that enormous suffering occurs during
rearing, gain little or no support by
bringing killing into the picture and
that appeals to moral consistency do
nothing to support the claim that kill
ing animals is morally unjustified.
Thus, if one is to show that pain
lessly killing animals for: food is
wrong, some other strategy of rational
persuasion is needed. 30

Thomas Young
Mansfield University
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